











































Citation for published version:
Mac Amhlaigh, C 2017, Pluralising constitutional pluralism. in In Pursuit of Pluralist Jurisprudence.
Cambridge University Press, pp. 64-89. DOI: 10.1017/9781316875056.004
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1017/9781316875056.004
Link:




In Pursuit of Pluralist Jurisprudence
Publisher Rights Statement:
This material has been published in "In Pursuit of Pluralist Jurisprudence" edited by Roughan, N., & Halpin, A.
This version is free to view and download for personal use only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in
derivative works. © Cambridge University Press.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2018
 1 
 
Pluralising Constitutional Pluralism 
Cormac Mac Amhlaigh 




It is a commonplace in much contemporary political and legal thinking that global 
order is undergoing a transition from a ‘Westphalian’ era where law and politics 
operated, and was therefore studied, according to a neat dichotomy -  
domestic/international, constitutional law/public international law - to a more 
complex ‘post-Westphalian’ one where this dichotomy appears increasingly 
redundant.  This ‘post-Westphalian world’ entails the demotion of the state from the 
centre of the political universe to one among a number of actors in a broader setting 
where international institutions rival states for authority and influence.1  Sovereignty, 
if relevant to this worldview is of a ‘late’2 form rather than the ‘high sovereignty’3 of 
the Westphalian age. 
                                                 
1 N. Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism:  The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law  (OUP, 2010), 5. 
2 N. Walker, ‘Late Sovereignty in the European Union’ in N. Walker (ed) Sovereignty in Transition 
(Hart 2003). 
3  C. Mac Amhlaigh, ‘Late Sovereignty in post-integration Europe:  Continuity and change in a 
constitutive concept’ in  R. Adler-Nissen and U. Pram Grad  (eds) European Integration and 
Postcolonial Sovereignty Games (Routledge 2013), 42. 
 2 
Yet, even if the analytical tools of the Westphalian era, and particularly the 
overarching ‘metaprinciple’ 4  of state sovereignty, are becoming increasingly 
redundant as analytical frameworks to capture an emergent post-Westphalian global 
order, we have yet to identify an organising analytical frame which would take its 
place. As such, the transition from the ‘Westphalian’ to the ‘post-Westphalian’ 
involves the replacement of a global order of legal orders based on the idea of state 
sovereignty to a global, in Walker’s memorable coining, disorder of legal orders.5  
Rather than one overarching metaprinciple to organise the array of legal orders co-
existing in the contemporary world there are a variety of competing analytical frames 
which attempt to organise the co-existence of multiple legal orders in particular 
ways.6  
Of particular interest to law and legal theory in this context of transition from 
a Westphalian to a post-Westphalian globe has been the growth of self-contained 
regimes beyond the state7 involving some combination of administrative, legislative 
or judicial functions which more closely resemble the normative orders of states than 
the classic model of suprastate 8  law; public international law with its attendant 
                                                 
4 N Walker, ‘Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder of Normat ive 
Orders’ (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 373, 376. 
5 Ibid. , 376 
6  For example Walker identifies seven potential ‘g lobal metaprinciples of legal authority’; state 
sovereigntist, global hierarchical, unipo lar, regional, integrity, legal-field discursive and pluralist. 
Walker, above n 4, 386. 
7 B. Simma and D. Pu lkowski, ‘Of Planets and the Universe:  Self-contained Regimes in International 
Law’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law , 483-529. 
8 ‘Suprastate’ in this chapter is taken to mean simply ‘beyond the state’.  As such suprastate law relates 
to any law or legal order beyond the state regardless of its classification as public international law or 
otherwise.  Similarly ‘state’ will be used interchangeably with ‘national’, ‘domestic’ and ‘municipal’.  
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problems of effectiveness and enforcement 9  and its putatively ‘primitive’ nature.10 
The proliferation of these types of regimes as well as the fact that their jurisdictions 
frequently overlap have led to inevitable interaction and sporadic conflicts between 
them which, given their unusual nature, at least as compared with classic public 
international law, seem to resist analysis and resolution by reference to the classic 
monist or dualist mechanisms of mediating the relationship between state and 
suprastate normative orders. 
The idea of constitutional pluralism has become a popular ‘frame’ with which 
to analyse and organise the global disorder of legal orders and in particular the 
interaction and sporadic conflicts between them.11  Originating in the work of Neil 
                                                 
9 See generally J. Tasioulas, ‘The Legit imacy of International Law’ in S. Besson and J. Tasioulas (eds), 
The Philosophy of International Law (OUP, 2010). 
10 As asserted most famously by HLA Hart:  ‘In form, international law resembles [..] a [primitive ] 
regime of primary rules, even though the content of its often elaborate rules are very unlike those of a 
primitive society, and many of its concepts, methods, and techniques are the same as those of modern 
municipal law.’ HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon, Oxford, 1994), 227. The debate has 
moved on considerably in recent years.  See J. Waldron, ‘International Law;  “A Relatively Small and 
Unimportant” Part of Jurisprudence?’ In L Duarte d’Almeida, J Edwards, A Dolcetti (eds), Reading 
HLA Hart’s ‘The Concept of Law’ (Hart, Oxford, 2013), S. Besson ‘Theorizing the Sources of 
International Law’ in S. Besson and J Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of International Law (OUP, 
Oxford, OUP 2010), R. Dworkin, ’A New Philosophy for International Law’ (2013) 41(1) Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 2-30, AL Paulus, ’The International Legal System as a Constitution’ in JL Dunoff 
and JP Tractman (eds), Ruling the World?  Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global 
Governance (CUP 2009). 
11  The literature on constitutional pluralism is increasing exponentially.  For some representative 
examples see N MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty (OUP 1999), Ch. 7; N. Walker, ‘The Idea o f 
Constitutional Pluralis m’ (2002) 65 MLR 317; M. Maduro, ‘Contrapunctual Law:  Europe’s 
Constitutional Pluralism in  Action’ in N. Walker (ed) Sovereignty in Transition (Hart 2003); M. 
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MacCormick, and in particular his theorisation of the relationship between domestic 
constitutional law and the law of the EU, it has since developed and expanded beyond 
its traditional domicile of the relationship between EU law and national law to extend 
to a variety of different legal relationships globally.12  
In this chapter, one feature of constitutional pluralism will be analysed and 
critiqued; namely constitutional pluralism’s ‘methodological monism’.  This relates to 
the tendency in constitutional pluralist theorising to reduce the complex relationships 
between different legal orders to one single framework of pluralism, whether for 
analytical or normative purposes, in a post-Westphalian world.  In particular it will 
focus on the problems this methodological monism poses for constitutional 
pluralism’s explanatory ambition as well as its normative aims in understanding and 
managing interactions and conflicts between normative orders.  It argues that given 
the reliance of constitutional pluralism on the statements of legal officials and the 
diversity of those statements in practice, that such a methodologically monist 
approach to regime interactions is untenable.   
                                                                                                                                           
Kumm, ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict:  Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and 
after the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 11 ELJ 262; J. Baqeuro Cruz, ‘The Legacy of the Maastricht-
Urteil and the Pluralist Movement’ (2008) 14 ELJ  389; Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism above n 1 ; 
C. Mac Amhlaigh, ‘Concepts of Law in Integration Through Law’ in D. Augenstein (ed) ‘Integration 
Through Law Revisited:  The Making of the European Polity (Ashgate, 2012); M Avbelj and J 
Komárek, Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond  (Hart, Oxford, 2012). 
12 See Krisch above n 1; N Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Global Context ’ in M Avbelj 
and J Komárek, Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond  (Hart, Oxford, 2012); M 
Kumm ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism:  On the Relationship between Constitutionalism 
in and Beyond the State’ in JL Dunoff and JP Tractman (eds), Ruling the World?  Constitutionalism, 
International Law, and Global Governance (CUP, Cambridge, 2009). 
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The challenge will be mounted in a series of steps.  Firstly, the methodological 
monist tendency in constitutional pluralism will be outlined.  Then, drawing primarily 
on MacCormick’s original writings on constitutional pluralism, the relevance of 
reconceptualising suprastate law to constitutional pluralism will be highlighted and 
the relationship between this reconceptualization and the statements of suprastate 
legal officials will then be established. The chapter will then pursue the claim that the 
statements of suprastate legal officials differ between different suprastate legal orders 
by reference to an example of two suprastate legal orders which interact heavily with 
domestic state law;  EU law and the law of the European Convention of Human rights 
(ECHR).   The chapter concludes that the methodological monist tendency in 
pluralism cannot be maintained in the light of the existence of diverse forms of 
suprastate law at least as evidenced by the differential claims to authority and 
effectiveness of suprastate normative orders by their legal officials in the emergent 
global (dis)order.  
 
2. Constitutional Pluralism and Methodological Monism 
Constitutional pluralism attempts to capture the increasingly complex global order 
and in particular the interactions between normative orders by establishing an 
analytical framework for interactions which departs from the classic ‘Westphalian’ 
account of interactions between state and suprastate law.   The classic model of 
interaction between state law and suprastate law was dominated by the view that these 
forms of legal order were always necessarily in a hierarchical relationship to one 
another.  As such, the relationship between domestic constitutional law and public 
international law was primarily understood and regulated according to the idea of 
dualism, presupposing the prioritization of domestic law over public international law 
 6 
in a vertical or hierarchical relationship.  The alternative, and rarer in practice, 
account of interacting legal systems – monism – operated according to this 
hierarchical mind-set, albeit in this case the positions were inverted such that 
suprastate law (essentially public international law) was hierarchical to state law;13 a 
position resurrected in the context of EU law. 14   Constitutional Pluralism effectuates 
a shift from this Westphalian hierarchical ordering of the interaction between legal 
orders by collapsing the ‘verticality’ of traditional thinking about the relationships 
between legal orders to one of ‘horizontality’.  That is that constitutional pluralism 
encourages us to think about the relationships between state and suprastate law in a 
heterarchical15 rather than hierarchical way; that is as operating side-by-side without 
the presumptive authority of one over the other. 
By collapsing the interaction between legal orders from a vertical plane to a 
horizontal one, from a ‘y axis’ to an ‘x axis’, constitutional pluralism aims at 
providing a more nuanced and accurate account of interacting normative orders in an 
emergent post-Westphalian global (dis)order than the conventional hierarchical 
Westphalian account.  Whereas this was initially aimed at understanding and 
exploring the relationships between EU law and state law in the work of Neil 
MacCormick, it has since been employed to explain interactions and conflicts 
                                                 
13 As promoted primarily by Hans Kelsen.  See H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State  (A. 
Wedberg trans.) (Harvard  University Press 1945), Ch. VI.  However, subsequent more ‘sociolo gical’ 
accounts of law such as HLA Hart’s have tended to relegate public international law to a lesser form of 
law at least when compared with municipal law.  See above n 10. 
14 See Case 14/64 Costa v. ENEL (1964).  For  the application of monis m in the EU context see C. 
Richmond ‘Preserving the Identity Crisis:  Autonomy, System and Sovereignty in European Law’ 
(1997) 16 Law and Philosophy  377. 
15 Walker ‘Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’, above n 11, 337. 
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between other legal orders up to, and including, between suprastate legal orders 
themselves.16  On top of this analytical function, constitutional pluralism also has a 
normative function which builds on these analytical insights to either critique or 
endorse interactions and conflicts between normative orders by lending normative 
support to either their resolution or persistence.  With regard to the question of 
resolution of conflicts, many accounts of constitutional pluralism attempt to provide a 
method of resolving conflicts between interacting legal orders to ensure consistency, 
certainty, fairness and the values associated with the rule of law and the protection of 
fundamental rights in judicial decision-making involving conflicting normative 
orders.17  This is usually done by fashioning a series of ‘conflic t principles’ to be 
applied to regime interactions and conflicts to ensure the optimisation of these values 
where interactions and conflicts occur. 18   Others endorse conflicts and their 
irresolution as per se normatively desirable.  Krisch, for example, has advanced a 
normative defence of pluralism based on the pluralist ‘virtues’ of adaptation, 
contestation and checks and balances.19  Unlike those normative accounts prescribing 
principles for the resolution of conflicts, Krisch celebrates their absence in 
interactions and conflicts between orders, as the absence of such conflict principles 
helps to attain the contestational virtues of pluralism.20 
                                                 
16  Such as the application of pluralism to the legal orders of the European Union and the United 
Nations; see G. de Búrca, ‘The ECJ and the international legal order: a  re-evaluation’ in G. de Búrca 
and J. H. H. Weiler (eds) The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (CUP, 2012).  
17 For salient examples of this see Kumm, ‘Jurisprudence’ above n. 11, Maduro above n11. 
18 Ibid.  See also C. F. Sabel and O. Gerstenberg, ‘Constitutionalising and Overlapping Consensus:  
The ECJ and the Emergency of a Coordinate Constitutional Order’ (2010) 16:5 ELJ 511. 
19 Krisch, above n 1, Ch. 3 
20 Ibid. 
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Notwithstanding the dual functions of constitutional pluralism, most accounts of 
constitutional pluralism are methodologically monist in the sense that they assume 
that one analytical framework of pluralism, or one set of pluralist principles or values 
is apt to capture, understand or legitimize the entire post-Westphalian order.21  There 
are many examples which could be offered in this regard; for example, constitutional 
pluralism’s originator, Neil MacCormick, originally sketched out two possible models 
of pluralism, yet still assumed that only one would be necessary to give an account of 
interacting legal orders in the post-Westphalian context.22 However few constitutional 
pluralists rival Mattias Kumm’s work on constitutional pluralism for the breadth of its 
ambition and its unalloyed methodological monism.23  
                                                 
21 Given that normat ive accounts of pluralism rely on the presupposition of interacting and conflict ing 
normative o rders based on analytical accounts of pluralism, the two are inext ricab ly linked and many 
accounts of constitutional pluralis m straddle the analytical/normat ive divide.   As such analytical or 
explanatory dimension of pluralism are ‘lexically prior’ to the normative accounts.  The focus in this 
chapter will be primarily on constitutional pluralism’s explanatory functions, however given that its 
normative dimensions rely on these explanatory accounts, the challenge to constitutional pluralis m 
raised here will also impact upon normative accounts of constitutional pluralism.   
22  See MacCormick, ‘Questioning Sovereignty’ above n 11, 116-7.  See also the contributions to 
Avbelj and Komárek (above n 11) virtually all of which assume this methodological monist approach 
to  constitutional pluralism. 
23  Kumm’s work on pluralism is wide-ranging.  Fo llowing MacCormick, he began by looking at 
pluralism between municipal law and EU law; see ‘Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in 
Europe?,’ (1999) 36 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 351, ‘Jurisprudence’ above n 11; before moving to view 
pluralism in a more global context;  ‘The Legit imacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist 
Framework of Analysis ,’ (2004) 15 Eur. J. Int'l L. 907; ‘Cosmopolitan Turn’ above n 12; ‘The Moral 
Point of Constitutional Pluralism: Defining the Domain of Legit imate Institutional Civil Disobedience 
and Conscientious Objection’ in J. Dickson and P. Eleftheriadis (eds)  Philosophical Foundations of 
European Union Law  (OUP, 2012),  ‘Rethinking Constitutional Authority: On the Structure and 
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Kumm argues that the transition from a Westphalian to a post-Westphalian world 
requires a ‘Copernican turn’ 24  in constitutionalism from a Westphalian ‘statist 
paradigm’25 regarding the relationship and interaction between state and suprastate 
law.  This Copernican turn involves reconceptualising suprastate law in ‘post-
Westphalian’ constitutional terms as well as rejecting the privileging of the ‘statist 
paradigm’ in viewing the relationship between international law and state law; 26 in 
other words rejecting the state-sovereigntist paradigm as the ‘metaprinc iple’ of global 
order. In the place of state sovereignty Kumm argues for a form of constitutional 
pluralism which he calls ‘cosmopolitan constitutionalism’27 to understand and manage 
interactions between orders. 28   This framework of constitutional pluralism both 
explains as well as provides normative benchmarks for interaction and conflicts 
between state and suprastate legal orders according to the principles of legality, 
subsidiarity, due process, democracy and constitutional rights protection.29  
Most significantly from the viewpoint of methodological monism are Kumm’s  
claims regarding the model of constitutional pluralism he advances and what it does 
in the context of an emergent post-Westphalian (dis)order.  He argues that his 
                                                                                                                                           
Limits of Constitutional Pluralism’ M Avbelj and J Komárek, Constitutional Pluralism in the 
European Union and Beyond (Hart, Oxford, 2012);  ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An 
Integrative Conception of Public Law’ (2013) 20 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 605.  Here ‘Cosmopolitan 
Turn’ will be relied on in the main as a paradigm of his account of constitutional pluralism.    
24 Kumm, above n 12, 266. 
25 Kumm, above n 12, 261. 
26 Kumm, above n 12, part 2. 
27 Kumm, above n 12, 272. 
28 Kumm, above n 12, 274. 
29 Kumm, above n 12. Part 2. 
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paradigm of cosmopolitan constitutionalism describes the ‘deep structure of public 
law’, 30  including the ‘basic structural features of international and domestic 
constitutional law practices in liberal constitutional democracies’. 31   ‘Cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism’ establishes an ‘integrative basic conceptual framework’ 32  for a 
‘general theory of public law that integrates national and international law.’33  As 
such, Kumm argues, this model of constitutional pluralism provides a ‘unifying’34 
framework for the different interactions between state and suprastate law as well as a 
host of other features of the post-Westphalian world including the increasing 
complexity of global governance,  the ‘functional reconceptualization’ of sovereignty, 
as well as basic structural features of contemporary human rights practice.35   
 In the remainder of this chapter it will be shown how these grand claims are 
unsustainable in the global context, not least by constitutional pluralism’s own lights 
through its reliance on the statements of (particularly suprastate) legal officials as 
evidence of the emergence of a post-Westphalian (dis)order, the transformation of 
suprastate law and the relevance of constitutional pluralism to that (dis)order. 
3. Constitutional, not legal, pluralism. 
The idea of pluralism in law predates the current flurry of attention from lawyers 
and legal theorists focusing on interactions between state and suprastate law.   In the 
1960s and 1970s, legal anthropologists and sociologists, looking primarily at non-
European, often post-colonial, states conceptualised a pluralist universe of official and 
                                                 
30 Kumm, above n 12, 262. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Kumm, above n 12, 264. 
33 Kumm, above n 12, 264.  Emphasis in original. 
34 Ibid. Emphasis Added. 
35 Kumm above n 12, 262. 
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unofficial legal orders which presupposed the ‘coexistence within a social group of 
legal orders which do not belong to a single ‘system’. 36  Central to these accounts of 
law and legal system was the debunking of the ‘myth’ that only formal municipal 
legal systems, the object of study of analytical positivism, could be classified as law 
and legal system properly so-called.37 
MacCormick’s influential initial exploration of constitutional pluralism in 
suprastate law, which has informed subsequent thinking on the topic, seemed to track 
these anthropological and sociological accounts of legal pluralism. 38  However, 
MacCormick’s pluralism envisaged pluralism between ‘institutional normative 
orders’, an account of law and legal system drawing on the core tenets of analytical 
positivist accounts of law including the idea of legal officials, official sources and a 
hierarchy of norms. 39   As such a key difference between MacCormick’s (and 
subsequent accounts of) constitutional pluralism and previous accounts of legal 
pluralism was that constitutional pluralism envisaged pluralism between official forms 
of law; while simultaneously shifting the level of analysis from forms of normative 
                                                 
36 J. Griffiths, ‘What is legal p luralis m?’ (1986) J. Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1, See also S. E. 
Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism’ (1988) 22 Law and Society Review 869. 
37 Griffiths, ibid. 4.  For a crit ique of this charge against legal positivism, see V. Muniz-Frat icelli, The 
Structure of Pluralism (Oxford 2014), Chapter 5. 
38 I say ‘seemed’ because nowhere in his writ ing that I could find did MacCormick explicitly refer to 
these writings or to these ideas advanced by legal pluralists.  Krisch seems to suggest that he was 
inspired by these accounts but I have not found explicit  evidence of this.  See N Krisch, ‘Who is Afraid 
of Radical Pluralism?  Legal Order and Political Stability in the Postnational Space?’ (2011) 24 Ratio 
Juris 386,  388. Walker seems to have been the first to explicit ly distinguish constitutional pluralis m 
from other forms of legal pluralism.  See Walker ‘Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’,  above n 11 336-7. 
39 MacCormick, ‘Questioning Sovereignty’ above n 11, Ch. 1; N. MacCormick, Institutions of Law 
(OUP 2007). 
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order at and beneath the state level, to normative orders at and beyond the state level.  
Therefore, on a jurisprudential spectrum of accounts of forms of law and legal orders 
from the very informal such as the ‘self-regulation of a ‘semi-autonomous social 
field’ 40  to the very formal as exemplified by the analytical positivist trad ition, 
constitutional pluralism tended strongly towards the latter form.  
As well as marking a break with other forms of legal pluralism, 
MacCormick’s approach also marked a departure from conventional ways of 
theorising law and legal systems in analytical jurisprudence.  Conventional 
approaches to theorising law and legal systems tended to rely on the traditional 
Westphalian dichotomy of municipal law/international law; the latter popularly 
characterised as a lesser or more ‘primitive’ form of law. 41   However, MacCormick 
eschewed this conventional Westphalian dichotomy in legal theory to conceptualise a 
form of law which did not recognise the boundary between the state and international 
levels by severing the link between law and the state. 42  All that was required for the 
existence of an institutional normative order for MacCormick, was a system of norms 
that was autonomous, involved judgment which was institutionalized and was 
systemic in character.43  For MacCormick, even if states were a ‘paradigmatic’44 or 
‘principal’45 example of an institutional normative order it was but a ‘species’ of the 
                                                 
40  S. Falk Moore, ‘Law and Social Change:  The semi-autonomous social field as an appropriate 
subject of study’ (1973) 7(4) Law & Society Review 719. 
41 Hart, above n 10. 
42 MacCormick, ‘Questioning Sovereignty’ above n 11, 17.  See also N. MacCormick, ‘Beyond the 
Sovereign State’ (1993) 56 MLR 1. 
43 MacCormick, ‘Questioning Sovereignty’ above n 11, 6-7 
44 MacCormick, ‘Questioning Sovereignty’ above n 11, 1. 
45 Ibid. 
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‘genus’.46  Thus, MacCormick concluded: ‘law is institutional order, and state-law is 
simply one form of law.’47   
As such, a particular conception of formal or official law, and particularly a 
reconceptualization of the nature of suprastate law in ‘constitutional’ terms beyond 
the classic theoretical formulations of public international law as a species of 
‘primitive’ legal order, was a crucial step in theorising interacting orders in 
constitutional pluralist terms.  This was explicitly acknowledged by MacCormick 
himself in that he claimed that that certain conceptions of law (in his case law as 
‘institutional normative order’) admitted a particular form of pluralism.48  This, in 
turn, meant that it would interact with another institutional normative order - in 
particular municipal law – in a manner distinct from the conventional methods of 
international law dualism; as capable of interacting heterarchically rather than 
hierarchically.  
 
4. Legal Officials and Constitutional Pluralism. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly given the shift in MacCormick’s account of pluralism in 
law from pluralism involving unofficial forms of law, to pluralism between official 
forms of law, legal officials have played a prominent role in this reconceptualization 
of suprastate law.  Indeed, the main catalyst for reconceptualising suprastate law 
beyond the Westphalian hierarchical model to a post-Westphalian heterarchical one in 
constitutional pluralism has been the statements of particular suprastate legal officials; 
namely courts and tribunals.  This is clear in MacCormick’s original exploration of 
                                                 
46 MacCormick, ‘Questioning Sovereignty’ above n 11, 1. 
47 MacCormick, ‘Questioning Sovereignty’ above n 11, 15. 
48 MacCormick, ‘Questioning Sovereignty’ above n 11, 102. 
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the idea through the problematization of the relationship between EU law and state 
law in the light of particular judgments from the German Federal Constitutional Court  
(GFCC) on the effect of EU law within the German Constitutional order, 49 but it is 
also true for the majority of subsequent theorising of constitutional pluralism.50 
  In attempting to theorise EU law in a post-Westphalian way, and particularly in 
an attempt to understand its relationship with other orders, MacCormick focused on 
the statements of the legal official par excellence of the EU legal system , the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and in particular its early decisions on the 
authority, nature and effects of EU law.   Key to the CJEU’s activities in this regard 
was the distinction between EU law and conventional public international law by 
insisting on the autonomy and hierarchy of the former, which was not contingent 
upon how the law of EU Member States chose to implement it.  In MacCormick’s 
words:51 
‘The Court’s initiative was a decisive one when it interpreted the juridical 
character of the entity brought to birth through the foundation trea ties as being a 
distinct legal order.  This was an order of a new and hitherto unique kind, one whose 
norms were directly applicable and directly effective [which] were to be accorded 
supremacy in each state over national law.  These decisions necessarily imply that the 
foundation treaties […] amount effectively to the constitutional framework of a quite 
special entity, this ‘European commonwealth’.’ 
                                                 
49 See part icularly N. MacCormick, ‘The Maastricht-Urteil:  Sovereignty Now’ (1995) 1 ELJ 259.  See 
also MacCormick, ‘Questioning Sovereignty’ above n 11. 
50 See references at n 11 above. 
51 MacCormick, ‘Questioning Sovereignty’ above n 11, 97. 
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These developments, MacCormick argued, had a profound impact upon how EU 
law was theorised.  In applying legal theory to understand EU law qua law, he argued 
that ‘the [CJEU’s] decisions on the juridical character of Community and Union have 
particular importance.’52  As such, a ‘post-Westphalian’ conceptualisation of EU law, 
distinct from a ‘Westphalian’ understanding of EU law as public international law, 
was needed in the light of the statements of the EU’s primary legal official.  In this 
way, the CJEU’s statements effectively ‘caused’ the Westphalian ‘y axis’ to fall to a 
post-Westphalian ‘x axis’ in conceptualising EU law as a particular (post-
Westphalian) form of law which had significant implications for how it interacted 
with other legal orders and therefore for constitutional pluralism.   This 
reconceptualization of suprastate law in ‘post-Westphalian’ terms through the reliance 
on the statements of suprastate legal officials is a key feature of most subsequent 
pluralist theorising of normative orders, albeit that the precise conceptions of law 
extrapolated from – sometimes the same – set of legal officials have differed.53 
Of course in relying on the statements of suprastate legal officials as the 
foundation of constitutional pluralism, constitutional pluralists are drawing on a 
venerable tradition of foregrounding the role of legal officials, and almost always 
                                                 
52 MacCormick, ‘Questioning Sovereignty’ above n 11, 97.  Emphasis Added. 
53  For example, Kumm, Maduro and Sabel and Gerstenberg in their writings on pluralis m have 
employed a less positivist understanding of EU law in theorizing the relationship between EU law and 
national law in p luralist terms. Kumm explicit ly draws on the work of non-positivists such as Ronald 
Dworkin and Robert A lexy in h is model of p luralis m, Kumm ‘Jurisprudence’ above n 11; Maduro 
draws on the constitutional theoretical work of Cass Sunstein to characterize principles of pluralism in 
terms of ‘incompletely theorized agreements’, Maduro above n 11; Sabel and Gerstenberg draw on the 
political theories of John Rawls, above 18. 
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courts, in theorising the concept of law.54   For example, Hart, famously, placed legal 
officials at the centre of his concept of law and legal system.55  In particular, the 
existence of the secondary ‘rule of recognition’, which established the validity of all 
the other norms of the system, was evidenced by its acceptance as such by the 
officials of the legal system.56     Such was the centrality of legal officials to his 
concept of a legal system that they were included as one of two necessary conditions 
for the existence of a legal order. 57   Whereas the notion of legal officials was 
reasonably broadly construed, it was clear that with respect to the rule of recognition, 
it was primarily courts that Hart had in mind.58   
In a similar vein, Raz emphasises the centrality of legal officials and 
particularly courts to the concept of law and legal system.  Distinguishing between 
norm-applying institutions and norm-creating institutions, he argues that only norm-
applying institutions are necessary for the existence of a legal order. 59   These 
institutions are primarily concerned with ‘the authoritative determination of 
normative situations in accordance with pre-existing norms’, 60  of which the 
paradigmatic example are courts.  A key feature of primary norm-applying organs in a 
                                                 
54 In this regard Raz attributes court-centric theories of law to a ‘large number of authors  - among them 
Holland, Gray, Salmond, Holmes, Llewelln, and Hart.’ J. Raz, The Authority of Law, (OUP 1979), 89. 
55 Hart, above n 10. 
56 Hart, above n 10, 115.  
57 Hart above n 10 , 117.    
58 H Sheinman, ‘The Priority of Courts in the General Theory of Law’ (2007) 52 Am J Juris. 229, 237. 
59 Raz above n 54, 105. 
60 Raz above n 54, 110. 
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legal order for Raz is their authority; that is that their decisions and determinations of 
normative situations are binding, even where they are mistaken.61   
Even legal theorists who distance themselves from the positivist tradition rely 
heavily, if not exclusively, on institutional practice, and particularly the institutional 
practices of courts in developing their conceptions of law. For example Ronald 
Dworkin’s well-known non-positivist conception of law infused with moral principles 
nonetheless relies on the institutional practices of courts, and particular legal 
statements, to argue for the centrality of principles in any concept of law.62   
As such, in taking the first step to a constitutional pluralist understanding of 
interacting legal orders, that is by positing a conception of suprastate law distinct 
from the conventional ‘Westphalian’ understanding of ‘primitive’ public international 
law, pluralists can be seen to be following in the tradition of main-stream legal theory 
(both positivist and non-positivist) in relying on the statements of suprastate legal 
officials, and particularly courts in developing particular theories of suprastate law.63   
However, although constitutional pluralist accounts of suprastate law based on the 
statements of suprastate legal officials follow in the tradition of mainstream legal 
theory, their reliance on legal officials involves an additional function to theorising 
suprastate law when compared with the statements of legal officials in theorising 
                                                 
61 Raz above n 54, 108. 
62 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth 1978), R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Duckworth 
1986).  
63 Of course MacCormick himself had a considerable stake in  this ‘mainstream’, having been a legal 
theorist of note prior to examin ing the relationship between interacting legal orders.  See for example 
N. MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Clarendon 1979); N. MacCormick and O 
Weinberger, An Institutional Theory of Law (Kluwer 1986). 
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municipal law.  In municipal legal theory a central, if not the primary, function of 
legal officials is to determine the validity and status of individual norms by reference 
to particular standards of validity within a particular legal system, or to identify the 
principles of the relevant legal order.64 However, theorists of suprastate law tend to 
take questions of the validity of suprastate norms for granted, instead focusing 
primarily on the type of (official) law in question, that is the type of authority and 
effectiveness particular (suprastate) norms, and systems, enjoy.  This is not to say that 
questions of authority and bindingness are irrelevant to the theorisation of municipal 
law.  Rather, law’s pre-emptive authority and bindingness is usually taken for granted 
at the state level where there is an assumption that law, properly so called, and once 
identified as a system, is ipso facto binding and authoritative.65   In the suprastate 
legal context, however, on top of assuming questions of validity and/or principles in 
suprastate law from the statements of legal officials, constitutional pluralists rely on 
the statements of legal officials as evidence of the transition from suprastate law as 
‘primitive’ public international law to suprastate law as an authoritative and effective 
normative order, that is as ‘constitutional’ post-Westphalian suprastate law, capable 
of interacting according to a constitutional pluralist framework.  
Again, MacCormick’s writings on the topic are instructive in this regard.  As 
well as foregrounding legal officials in developing his theory of law as ‘institutional 
normative order’, legal officials also have a fundamental role in allowing for a 
transformational reading of suprastate law beyond conventional public international 
law.   For MacCormick, judgment was crucial to idea of normative order in that being 
subject to a norm was to have one’s actions open to judgment as to whether one’s 
                                                 
64 Hart above n 10, Dworkin above n 62. 
65 Raz above n 54, Ch. 2 & 8. 
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actions conformed with a norm or not.66   In an institutional normative order, this 
judgment is institutionalised or ‘organised’. 67   Once judgment is institutionalised, 
MacCormick argues, there must be some rule about finality of judgment within the 
system which in turn leads to the systemic ordering of norms.68  The key question of 
validity is entailed in MacCormick’s account in that the finality of judgement within a 
system involves ‘final authority on the question of what counts as a binding norm and 
how it bears on the case’,69 which is ‘itself one which can only be pronounced with 
final effect by an appropriate judge or court.’70  So far, so conventional legal theory.  
However, in cases of normative order whose status or authority was ambiguous or 
disputed, either because it was not conventionally a form of law which was 
considered binding like municipal law or because of its ‘sui generis’ nature, the 
question of its empowerment, authority and effects could itself be achieved, 
MacCormick argued, through ‘institutional acts’. 71    A clear example of this 
development would be where the judges of a normative order ‘by their authoritative 
interpretation of their own powers and of other constitutional norms transform the 
character of the original empowerments involved’ 72  to one of a binding and 
authoritative normative order akin to municipal law.  As such, the question of whether 
the normative order was authoritative and binding itself was one to be determined by 
legal officials themselves (along with questions of validity).  This was the case even if 
                                                 
66 MacCormick, ‘Questioning Sovereignty’ above n 11, 6. 
67 MacCormick, ‘Questioning Sovereignty’ above n 11, 7. 
68 Ibid. 
69 MacCormick, ‘Questioning Sovereignty’ above n 11, 8. 
70 Ibid. 
71 MacCormick, ‘Questioning Sovereignty’ above n 11, 102. Emphasis Added. 
72 MacCormick, ‘Questioning Sovereignty’ above n 11, 103. 
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the determination was transformative of conventional understandings of the authority 
and bindingness of the relative order.  This highlighted the ‘self- referential’73 quality 
of such systems.   
This additional role for the statements of legal officials in theorising suprastate 
law can be explained by the fact that the ‘post-Westphalian world’ or its emergence, 
is still very much a work in progress.  If we are ‘still trying to find our way through 
the maze, or ‘mystery’, of global governance’ 74 , then the clear and categorical 
statements of legal officials about the nature of suprastate normative orders in terms 
of their ‘post-Westphalian’ authority and effectiveness provide a measure of certainty, 
clarity and familiarity in an otherwise uncertain, unclear and unfamiliar world.   
Municipal Legal Officials 
However, it is not only with respect to the reconceptualization of suprastate law in 
a post-Westphalian way that the statements of suprastate legal officials are important 
to constitutional pluralist theorising of the interaction of state and suprastate legal 
orders.  If the claims of authority and effectiveness of suprastate legal actors were 
taken at face value vis-à-vis state law then the ‘post-Westphalian world’ wouldn’t 
look particularly post-Westphalian at all.  For example, the claims of the CJEU 
regarding the supremacy, direct effect and Kompetenz-Kompetenz of EU law would 
have replaced Westphalian theories of hierarchical dualism, where national law was 
in a hierarchical relationship to suprastate law, with a Westphalian hierarchical 
monism, where suprastate law is in a hierarchical relationship to state law as 
                                                 
73 MacCormick, ‘Questioning Sovereignty’ above n 11, 7. 
74 Krisch above n 1, 26. 
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envisaged by Kelsen in his theorisation of international law. 75  This would remain 
within a resolutely hierarchical mind-set, where suprastate (EU) law would take 
precedence over state law in cases of conflicts.  However, as noted, constitutional 
pluralism involves a particular interpretation of a ‘post-Westphalian world’ whereby 
the emphasis shifts from hierarchical modes of interaction between orders to 
heterarchical modes.  As such, the statements of legal officials with which a 
particular system is interacting are also relevant to conceptualising interactions in 
heterarchical rather than hierarchical terms.  That is that the statements of legal 
officials of the other interacting order (often municipal legal orders) are also central to 
a post-Westphalian pluralist understanding of interacting orders. 
In the context of interactions between suprastate law and state law, the statements 
of the legal officials of state law have tended to be reactive; that is reacting to the 
statements of suprastate legal officials regarding the authority and effectiveness of 
suprastate law; usually denying or conditioning the claims of suprastate legal 
officials.76  For example, in the EU context, the statements of domestic courts, most 
                                                 
75 Kelsen above n 13.  Indeed, some authors have argued that constitutionalism pluralism involves the 
mere resurrection of monism in contemporary legal theory.  See for example, A. Somek, ‘Monism:  A 
Tale of the Undead’ in  M Avbelj and J Komárek, Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and 
Beyond (Hart, Oxford, 2012), Chapter 15. 
76 In this regard it is worth noting a potential shift among municipal legal officials with regard to the 
concept of municipal law. As noted, theories of municipal law, including those which relied on the 
statements of legal officials/courts, tend to assume the authority and effectiveness of the norms of these 
legal orders.  This was usually in the absence of exp licit statements from legal o fficials to this effect.  It 
is interesting to speculate on whether the necessity of articulating the authority and effectiveness of 
municipal law by legal officials in the light of the global ‘disorder of legal orders’, not least EU law, 
would have any effect on how municipal law is conceptualized.  It could be argued, for example, that 
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famously but hardly exclusively the GFCC77, tended to explicitly refute much of the 
authority claims of CJEU regarding the effects and status of EU law in national legal 
orders.  These statements from domestic legal officials made clear that EU law and 
national law were not part of one single system with EU law at the apex, or orders 
interacting according to the priority of EU law, but rather distinct interacting legal 
orders which looked at different sources of their own validity.  In MacCormick’s 
account of the EU context, it was the statements of municipal legal orders, and 
particularly their rejection of the authority claims of EU law vis-à-vis state law that 
forced legal thinking to view interactions in constitutional pluralist terms.  For 
MacCormick, the statements of the CJEU regarding the authority and effectiveness of 
EU law, alongside the reaction by state legal officials posed a ‘profound challenge to 
                                                                                                                                           
the articulation of authority and effectiveness of law in this way presupposes or recognizes a plurality 
of forms of law and legal orders in a way that conventional accounts of law and legal system may not 
have.  
77 The list of ‘copy-cat’ decisions from the apex Courts of other EU Member states is continually 
expanding.  However two recent intriguing additions to this list include the Czech Constitutional Court, 
which in its judgment Pl. US 5/12, Judgment o f 31 January 2012  ‘Slovak  Pensions’ carried  out the 
threat to defy the CJEU in a way that the GFCC only ever threated.  For Comment see R. Zb íral, ‘Case 
Comment:  A legal revolution or negligib le episode?  Court of Justice decision proclaimed ultra vires, 
(2012) 49 CMLR 1475-1492, J. Komárek, ‘Case Note:  Play ing with Matches:  the Czech 
Constitutional Court Declares a Judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU Ultra Vires’ (2012) 8(2) 
European Constitutional Law Review 323-337.  Also, the UK Supreme Court can now be said to have 
joined the ranks of ‘EU constitutional pluralist courts’ in the light of its decision in R(HS2 Action 
Alliance Ltd) v. SS for Transport [2014] UKSC 3. For comment see  A. Young, ‘Wilkommen zum 
Constitutional Pluralis m’ U.K. Const. L. Blog (17th February 2014)  (availab le 
at  https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/) 
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our understanding of law and legal systems’78  and brings us to the ‘frontier of legal 
pluralism.’ 79    The result, then, in the light of the statements of suprastate and 
municipal normative orders was one of constitutional pluralism: 80  
 ‘two sets of constitutions, each of which is acknowledged valid, yet neither of 
which does, or has any compelling reason to, acknowledge the other as a source of 
validity.  Where there is plurality of institutional normative orders, each with a 
functioning constitution (at least in the sense of body of higher-order norms 
establishing and condition relevant governmental powers), it is possible that each 
acknowledge the legitimacy of every other within its own sphere, while none asserts 
or acknowledges constitutional superiority over another.’ 
In such a scenario, MacCormick concluded, ‘constitutional pluralism’ prevails’.  81 
 
5. Constitutional Pluralism and the Problem of Methodological Monism 
It is the centrality of the statements of legal officials to theorise constitutional 
pluralism between state and suprastate legal orders that poses a challenge to the 
‘methodological monist’ tendencies of constitutional pluralists; that is, the tendency to 
assume that one model of constitutional pluralism can be used to explain the variety 
of interacting formal legal orders in the global disorder of legal orders.  As noted, in 
the Post-Westphalian context, not only are legal officials central to the identification 
of law and understanding law as a system whether according to a criteria of validity or 
the identification of principles, but they also make further, explicit, claims to the 
                                                 
78 MacCormick, ‘Questioning Sovereignty’ above n 11, 102. 
79 Ibid. 
80 MacCormick, ‘Questioning Sovereignty’ above n 11, 104. 
81 Ibid. 
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authority and effectiveness of the norms of the system.  Moreover, these claims elicit 
counter-claims from the legal officials of the systems at which those claims are 
addressed, usually municipal state legal systems.   However, given that the ‘post-
Westphalian’ world is very much still ‘under construction’, there is no fixed view of 
the nature, authority and effects of suprastate law as a post-Westphalian 
reconceptualization of law beyond the state.  As such, the global ‘disorder of legal 
orders’ is made up of a ‘global disorder’ of suprastate legal officials making a ‘global 
disorder’ of claims to the authority and effectiveness of the legal.   These claims, in 
turn, provide the foundation for the understanding of these systems as post-
Westphalian suprastate normative orders.  
  This can be illustrated by contrasting the development of EU law and the law of 
the European Convention of Human Rights qua post-Westphalian suprastate 
normative orders.  These two legal orders entail different claims to the authority and 
effectiveness of their norms, different interactions with municipal law based on these 
claims, and therefore necessitate different models of constitutional pluralism to 
explain that interaction.82 
                                                 
82 As will be by now clear, interactions between EU law and state law are the ‘paradigm case’ of  
constitutional pluralis m in  post-Westphalian world  and have attracted the attentions of many  
constitutional pluralists.  See for example the contributions in Avbelj and Komárek above n 11.  
Pluralism between state law and ECHR law has attracted less attention but the relationship is being 
increasingly theorized in pluralist terms.  See N. Krisch, ‘The Open Architecture of European Human 
Rights Law’ (2008) 71(2) MLR 183, S. Greer and L. Wildhaber, ‘Revisit ing the Debate about 
‘constitutionalising’ the European Court of Human Rights’ (2013) 12(4) HRLR 655, C. Mac Amhlaigh, 
‘”Even Children Lisp the Rights of Man’:  International Human Rights Law and National Minority 
Jurisdictions’ in S. Tierney (ed) Nationalism and Globalisation (Hart 2015). 
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The relevance of the CJEU’s statements and impact on theorising EU law has 
already been outlined above.  The key aspects of the CJEU’s ‘constitutionalisation’ of 
the EU Treaties were the autonomy of EU law, its authority as a form of law through 
the supremacy doctrine,83 and its effects in municipal legal orders through its direct 
effect doctrine and its claims to its own Kompetenz-Kompetenz, the ability to 
determine the limits of EU law. 84   These statements have led both to a 
reconceptualization of EU law as a form of law distinct from public international law,  
as well as eliciting robust counter-reactions from national courts claiming the 
supremacy of their municipal constitutional law and their own Kompetenz-
Kompetenz.  This experience can be contrasted with the development of the ECHR 
system by its Court (ECtHR).  
The ECHR’s trajectory differed from that of EU law in that its evolution to a 
suprastate legal order occurred later, and less invasively, than that of EU law.  There 
were a series of ‘constitutionalising’ judgments from the Court in the 1970s when the 
key ‘post-Westphalian’ characteristics of the ECHR were established: the margin of 
appreciation doctrine, the use of the principle of proportionality and the development 
of particular interpretive doctrines by the Court including the ‘evolutionary approach’ 
and the use of a ‘European consensus’. 85   These developments, combined with 
landmark high-profile judgments finding convention violations against prominent 
                                                 
83 See Mac Amhlaigh above n 11.   
84 See C. Mac Amhlaigh, ‘The European Union’s Constitutional Mosaic:  Big ‘C’ or Small ‘c’, Is that 
the Question?’ in N.Walker, J. Shaw and S.Tierney (eds) Europe’s Constitutional Mosaic (Hart  2011). 
85 See generally A. Follesdal, B. Peters, G. Ulfstein, Constituting Europe:  The European Court of 
Human Rights in a National, European and Global Context (CUP 2013),  L. R. Helfer, ‘Redesigning 
the European Court of Human Rights:  Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Princip le of the European 
Human Rights Regime’ (2008) 19 EJIL 125.  
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signatory states of the Convention, 86  marked a shift from Westphalian ‘legal 
diplomacy’87 to a more post-Westphalian ‘constitutional’ character both of the norms 
of the convention as well as court itself. 88   However, what is noticeable in the 
development of the ECHR from a Westphalian order to a more post-Westphalian one 
is the absence of any robust claims to the authority and effectiveness of ECHR law 
akin to the supremacy of EU law or the Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the CJEU. There is 
a distinct absence of the idea of the ‘supremacy’ of the ECHR over norms of national 
law in the development of the ECHR system.  Rather than insisting upon the 
supremacy of the provisions of the Convention in municipal law, their interaction 
was, according to the Court, to be managed by the political organs of signatory states 
according to their own constitutional arrangements as and when they saw fit.89  This 
                                                 
86 Such as, for example, the Court’s seminal decision in  Case No. 5310/71 Ireland v. U.K , Judgment of 
18 January 1978. 
87 MR Madsen, ‘The Protracted Institutionalization of the Strasbourg Court:  From Legal Diplomacy  to 
Integrationist Jurisprudence’ in J Christoffersen and MR Madsen (eds), The European Court of Human 
Rights between Law and Politics (Oxford University Press 2011),  44. 
88 See A Stone Sweet, ‘On the Constitutionalisation of the Convention:  The European Court of Human 
Rights as a Constitutional Court’ (2009) Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme , A Stone Sweet, ‘A 
cosmopolitan legal order:  Constitutional Pluralism and rights adjudication in Europe’ (2012) 1 Global 
Constitutionalism 53. 
89  Of course this doesn’t mean that the Court hasn’t recommended changes to domestic practices 
deemed to be causing human rights violations. In part icular, the introduction of ‘p ilot judgments’ by 
the court has also led to prescriptions from the court on how to better comply with the convention.  See 
Broniowski v. Poland 2002-X;  40 EHRR 21; Hutten-Czapska v. Poland 2006-VIII: 45 EHRR 4.  For 
discussion and analysis of this practice, see W. Sadurski, ‘Partnering with Strasbourg:  
Constitutionalisation of the European Court of Human Rights, the Accession of Central and East 
European States to the Council of Europe, and the Idea of Pilot Judgments’ (2009) 9:3 HRLR 397.  
Nonetheless, even if these developments result in a more invasive scrutiny of domestic p ractices and 
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was in line with the Court’s insistence on its ‘subsidiary’ role in protecting the rights 
contained in the Convention.90  For the ECtHR, it was states, and not the Court, which 
had the primary responsibility for protecting the relevant rights within their own 
systems. 
Furthermore, the ECtHR has never made claims regarding the effectiveness of 
ECHR comparable with those of the CJEU.  Rather than claiming the direct effect of 
the norms of the ECHR, the Court found that states had autonomy as to how precisely 
they wished to give effect to the rights of the Convention within their domestic 
orders.91  This deferential approach to the questions of the authority and effectiveness 
of the Convention was particularly clear in the Court’s adoption of the well-known 
‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine; a much more flexible and deferential tool to 
manage the interactions between ECHR law and domestic law, and the relationship 
between their legal officials which did not have an equivalent in EU law.92   
 Of course this more deferential approach to interactions by the ECtHR, did not 
avoid conflicts between ECHR law and national law.  National legal officials in the 
form of Supreme or constitutional courts have reacted to the EC tHR’s decisions by 
making more explicit the precise nature and effect of the ECHR’s norms, and, perhaps 
                                                                                                                                           
recommendations for legislative change, it is still much ‘softer’, more dialogic than the direct effect 
and supremacy of EU law.   
90 ‘[The Court] reiterates that the supervision machinery set up by the Convention is subsidiary to the 
national human rights protection systems.’ Salik v. Greece, 24 EHRR (1996) 323, 339. 
91 See generally Helfer, ‘Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights’ above n 85. 
92 The preliminary reference procedure of the EU system does not open up court dialogue in the same 
way.  Rather it  operates to ensure the CJEU’s exclusive jurisdiction in matters of EU law rather than a 
softening or delegation of the CJEU’s jurisdiction.  See generally P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law:  
Text, Cases and Materials (OUP 2015), Chapter 15. 
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more importantly, their interpretation by the ECtHR in municipal legal orders, 
notwithstanding the ECtHR’s views on the issue.93  On some occasions this has led to 
national courts explicitly rejecting a decision or interpretation of the Convention by 
the ECtHR.94  However the nature and tone of these reactions to the ECHR and its 
court by national courts is markedly different from national court reactions’ to the 
nature and authority of EU law.  Even in the most extreme forms of conflict, where 
domestic courts have explicitly gone against a clear judgment from the ECtHR, the 
reaction has not involved the rejection of the relevance of the rights and values 
contained in the ECHR within domestic legal orders. Rather the conflicts have 
emerged from disagreements about precisely what those rights mean and how they 
should be protected.95  In no instance has a domestic Court rejected the norms of the 
Convention themselves, the Court’s role in interpreting them, nor found that in cases 
of conflict that the national constitution would subordinate fundamental rights 
protections in a manner similar to the threats from national courts with regard to the 
application of EU law.   
                                                 
93  See for example the GFCC’s Gorgulu decision, Judgment of 14 October 2004, 2 BvR 1481/04 
where the GFCC stated that the Convention could not be applied in such a way that would violate the 
German basic law.   
94 See for example, the UK Supreme Court in R. v. Horncastle and others (SC(E)) [2010] 2 AC 373 
where the Court refused to follow the ECtHR’s lead on the interpretation of the right to a fair trial 
under Article 6 of the ECHR.  
95 In refusing to follow the ECtHR in Horncastle (ibid.), the UK Supreme Court d id comment that it 
hoped that its decision would  result in  a ‘ valuable d ialogue between the domestic court and the 
Strasbourg court’ (para 11) within which the latter would ‘take account of the reasons that have led [the 
UKSC] not to apply [the ECtHR’s interpretation]’ (para 108). 
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The primary reason for this difference in evolution between ECHR law and 
national law when compared with EU law is the subject-matter of the relationship 
between the ECHR and national law; the protection of fundamental rights.  These 
rights and values are, according to the officials of both state and suprastate systems, 
an integral part of those systems, which creates a significant commonality between 
ECHR law and municipal state law and provides a basis for interaction in a less 
conflictual way.  In this way, the ‘suprapositive’ 96  values of ECHR law act as a 
‘bridge’ between the two legal orders, a common set of shared values which provide a 
basis of agreement between the legal officials of both systems,  about which 
disagreement about their meaning and effects can subsequently emerge.  Indeed, some 
courts have identified the role of the legal officials of both legal orders, municipal and 
ECHR, as ‘promoting a joint European development of fundamental rights.’97     
As such, unlike with respect to the relationship between EU law and municipal 
law, the relationship between ECHR law and national law entails a common bond in 
the rights and values protected by the Convention itself.  Although the legal officials 
of each system may disagree as to their meaning and effects, this has not undermined  
agreement on the rights themselves and their value.  When compared with conflicts 
involving EU law, these interactions and conflicts seem of a much softer sort. 
 
 
                                                 
96  G. Neuman, ‘Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance’ (2003) 55(5) 
Stanford Law Review 1863, 1868..  
97 Görgülü, above n 93, para. 62.  Emphasis Added.  Perhaps even more pointedly, this statement came 
from the GFCC, the court  which had so robustly refuted the authority claims  of the CJEU in respect of 
its application under the German  constitution in its Maastricht and Lisbon decisions. 2 BvR 2134/92 
and 2159/92 JZ 1993, 1100; [1994] 1 CMLR 57; BVerfGE, 2 be 2/08, Judgment of 30 June 2009. 
 30 
6. Which Pluralism? 
Within the ‘global disorder’ of legal officials making differing claims to the 
authority and effectiveness of suprastate law, then, some legal orders may be best 
theorised as a form of municipal ‘constitutional’ law, others may still more closely 
resemble ‘Westphalian’ accounts of public international law and others may resemble 
neither, warranting a ‘sui generis’ conception of law. Furthermore, different concepts 
of law may better explain different suprastate orders based on the claims of their legal 
officials.  As such, the global disorder of legal orders, given its emergent and 
uncertain state, may accommodate co-existing, yet conflicting accounts of law based 
on analytical positivism, interpretivism or others as yet to be theorised. 98  Indeed, in 
the light of a global disorder of suprastate authority claims, such a scenario is 
inevitable if the idea of a post-Westphalian conception of law as well as the idea of 
constitutional pluralism upon which it relies, are to make good on their explanatory 
claims, and as a corollary, the plausibility of their normative claims.  What this tells 
us, then, is that the Westphalian ‘y axis’ does not fall to a post-Westphalian ‘x axis’ in 
the same way, and to the same extent, across the post-Westphalian global ‘disorder of 
legal orders’. 
  At the very least, then, in the light of the differential claims to authority and 
effectiveness of suprastate legal officials, different models of constitutional pluralism 
will be required to explain interactions between different types of legal orders based 
on the different types of claims and counter-claims of legal officials.  MacCormick 
                                                 
98 One potential move in this direction is Culver and Giudice’s ‘inter-institutional’ account of law see 
K. Culver and M. Giudice, Legality’s Borders:  An  Essay in General Jurisprudence (OUP 2010); ‘Not 
a System but an Order:  An Inter-Institutional View of European Union Law’ in J. Dickson and P. 
Eleftheriadis, Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (OUP, 2013).  
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identified two distinct types of pluralism which have provided a template for models 
of constitutional pluralism more generally; radical pluralism and monist pluralism.99   
Radical pluralism entails the idea that two legal orders such as state and suprastate, 
interact on a horizontal plane, each self-referentially relying on their own validity 
without any ‘all purpose superiority of one system over the other.’100 Significantly for 
radical pluralism the management of the relationships between normative orders and 
in particular conflicts between them is not (nor should be) subject to common or 
shared norms between the two systems.  Rather, management of interaction and 
conflict is a ‘matter for circumspection and for political as much as legal 
judgment.’101 
  Monist pluralism, on the other hand, ‘triangulates’ the relationship between 
normative orders on a horizontal plane to include a third dimension.  This third 
dimension to the relationship takes the form of a series of norms external to, or shared 
by, both systems which provide a normative resource for the management of 
interactions and conflicts. This third dimension to interacting legal orders can be 
another legal system or a series of principles which serve to manage the relationship 
and conflicts between different legal orders.  An example of this type of ‘monist’ 
pluralism is MacCormick’s ‘pluralism under international law’ where the norms of 
public international law would constitute the apex of a triangular relationship between 
national law and EU law and provide the normative resources for the management of 
                                                 
99  It should be noted that what I here call ‘monist’ pluralis m, MacCormick called ‘plu ralism under 
international law’ although he did recognize its ‘monist’ characteristics. MacCormick, ‘Questioning 
Sovereignty’ above n 11,117 
100 MacCormick, ‘Questioning Sovereignty’ above n 11, 118. 
101 MacCormick, ‘Questioning Sovereignty’ above n 11, 120. 
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the conflicts between them, meaning that ‘we need not run out of law (and into 
politics) quite as fast as suggested by radical pluralism.’102   
In thinking about how to theorise the relationships between interacting legal 
orders in a post-Westphalian heterarchical rather than Westphalian hierarchical way, 
then the statements of legal officials, and particular their diversity must feature 
prominently in choosing between these models (and developing potential new models 
of pluralism).  As MacCormick noted in the EU context, when dec iding upon the 
most relevant model of pluralism to capture the interactions between EU law and 
national law, we must be ‘sensitive to the weight attached to the sui generis 
interpretation of [EU] law in the jurisprudence of the ECJ.’103 
 Notwithstanding the alternatives on offer in constitutional pluralism, the 
methodological monism persists in the sense that one alternative – either radical or 
monist or a variation thereof – is usually marshalled to explain all of the interactions 
between legal orders in the post-Westphalian context.104  However, in the light of the 
‘global disorder’ of legal officials’ statements and global disorder of forms of 
suprastate legal order, a ‘global disorder of constitutional pluralism’ necessarily 
follows as evidenced by the differences between the types of claims made about EU 
law and ECHR, the different reactions from domestic legal officials and the 
differences in the resulting constitutional pluralist relationship.  A first step in 
capturing the global disorder of constitutional pluralism would be to employ different 
constitutional pluralist alternatives simultaneously to describe different relationships 
                                                 
102 Ibid. 
103 MacCormick, ‘Questioning Sovereignty’ above n 11, 110. 
104 For example, as noted above, Kumm sees in pluralism a ‘unify ing framework’ Kumm, above n 12, 
262.  Similarly, Krisch argues that pluralism provides an ideal for ‘postnational society’ tout court.  
Krisch above n 1, 69-70. 
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in a post-Westphalian disorder of legal orders.  Thus, for example, in the light of the 
robust authority claims of EU law and the invasiveness of its effects in domestic law, 
and the equally robust negation of these effects by domestic courts, it might be best to 
theorise the interaction and conflicts between EU law and domestic law in radical 
pluralist terms.  The robust and seemingly categorical nature of the claims on either 
side seem to leave little room for an explanatory account of pluralism based on the 
‘triangulation’ of the relationship  by some overarching normative resource which 
could apply to, and manage, conflicts between them.105  On the other hand, it would 
appear that the interactions between ECHR law and national law might be better 
explained by reference to a monist model of pluralism.   The ‘softer’ nature of the 
‘constitutionalisation’ of the ECHR, at least when compared with EU law, as well as 
the ‘softer’ pluralism which has emerged from national courts, calls for a more 
consensual or dialogic account of pluralism than is the case with EU law.  As such 
monist pluralism seems to fit the bill, involving the interaction of two legal orders on 
a horizontal plane but whose interaction is, in turn, based on a common set of 
‘suprapositive’ values or principles which provide the basis for the resolution of 
conflicts between them.  These values and principles provide the framework of 
agreement within which disagreements, conflicts and pluralism can emerge as to their 
precise meaning and application.  Moreover, the various tools and doctrines employed 
by the ECHR, and particularly the ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine, seem to support 
this ‘monist’ pluralist reading of the interactions between ECHR law and domestic 
law.  
                                                 
105 Quite a common feature of constitutional pluralist accounts of the relationship between EU law and 
state law.  See, for example, Kumm, Maduro above n 11, and Sabel and Gerstenberg, above n 18.   
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 Of course, one doesn’t have to agree with the characterisation of the concept 
of suprastate law and/or constitutional pluralism between these systems outlined here 
to accept the argument against methodological monism in constitutional pluralism. 
The methodological monism which dominates constitutional pluralist thinking cannot 
be reconciled with the state of affairs upon which constitutional pluralists themselves 
rely.  It is not coherent with the assumptions that constitutional pluralists make about 
post-Westphalian concepts of suprastate law as well as the form and nature of 
interactions between suprastate law and other legal orders.   If post-Westphalian 
accounts of suprastate law, and particularly their authority and effectiveness – that is 
their ‘post-Westphalian’ credentials -  are disproportionately determined by the 
statements of legal officials (at least when compared with that of municipal law) and 
the conceptualisation of suprastate law is determinative of the type of constitutional 
pluralist relationship that ensues, then the diversity of statements of suprastate legal 
officials and corresponding reactions by state legal officials must be encapsulated in 
constitutional pluralist frameworks.  In order to achieve this, constitutional 
pluralism’s methodological monism must be abandoned and a ‘global disorder of 
constitutional pluralism’ embraced.  
 
7. Conclusion 
As a candidate ‘frame’ for ordering the global ‘disorder of legal orders’, pluralism 
provides a more flexible, more nuanced account of global legal ordering than some of 
its rivals such as the outmoded Westphalian state-sovereigntist account or some of the 
more rigid hierarchical accounts of global ordering such as global constitutionalism or 
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the constitutionalisation of international law. 106  However in order to capitalise on 
these particular ‘pluralist virtues’ of explanatory accuracy and nuance in the context 
of the complexity the current post-Westphalian ‘unsettlement’,107 the methodological 
monist tendency in pluralism must be resisted.  Approaches to interactions between 
legal orders must diversify to truly reflect the diversity itself in a global constellation 
of interacting normative orders as evidenced by the statements of the legal officials, 
both state and suprastate, engaged in constructing the realities of the post-Westphalian 
world.  In short, we need to pluralise constitutional pluralism. 
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